Abstract
Assessing Changes in the Global Financial Architecture from an Emerging
Market Perspective
I. Introduction
The global financial crisis (GFC) is the push for change in the global financial architecture (GFA). The primary cause of the GFC was lax financial regulation although a debate continues on the contribution of balance of payment imbalances and macroeconomic policies to financial fragility. As a consequence, the reforms proposed target each of these aspects.
The new institution created to coordinate the reforms process, due to the recognition that better coordination was required in a more interconnected globe with more spillovers, was the G-20. Although it lacked the comprehensive legal charter required for a formal international institution, it gave a voice to major emerging markets (EMs) in global dialogue, potentially reducing the dominance of the G-7 countries. EMs did get greater representation in some of the international institutions that comprise the
GFA but institutions-International Monetary Fund (IMF) and WB (World Bank)-
that monitor the policies decided on in the G-20, have not changed as much as necessary to credibly reflect the wider dispersion of economic power. Insufficient diversity encourages the -groupthink‖ that the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF indicted as a cause of the lack of action on many emerging pre-crisis financial risks.
Infirmities in the GFA were obvious for long. A G-20 plus (G22, 1998) was set up after the East Asian crisis also, but did not have much success in implementing the many sensible reform proposals that were floated even then, although this may have moderated or even prevented the GFC. Implementation was poor since the East Asian crisis did not impact the major financial centers. The latter believed they gained from the GFA as it was.
The GFC shook this belief, and there are now serious attempts at reform. There is some progress. But the prolonged global slowdown and continuing asymmetric power are both vitiating reform and further prolonging the slowdown. The paper examines how this is happening in both financial regulation, and in macroeconomic policies.
While weaknesses remain in addressing risks from shadow banking and large banks that are responsible for volatile capital flows to EMs, the underlying philosophy that intervention and controls distort markets and manipulate currencies weakens the toolbox available to EMs to deal with these flows. But the use of interest rates, quantitative easing (QE), and deficits are regarded as a valid response to domestic conditions, and their effect on commodity price inflation hitting EMs also not acknowledged. This asymmetric adjustment harms global stability and recovery.
Universal adoption of some basic minimal measures can close arbitrage gaps and resolve many problems.
After a brief discussion of the causes of the GFC and consequences for reform in Section II the chapter analyses global financial reforms including institutional changes in Section III. Section IV assesses global imbalances, unconventional macroeconomic policies, and the intermittent ‗currency wars'. Section V analyzes changes in global governance required for a better GFA, before Section VI concludes.
II. GFC: Causes and Consequences
The immediate cause of the GFC was financial fragility in the US and Europe. Legal changes due to a pro-market philosophy and belief in the efficacy of self-regulation encouraged lax regulation 1 . Incentives from features such as bonuses and accounting rules, encouraged procyclical behavior, as did no-skin-in-the-game securitization and market price based risk models. Short-term funding combined with high leverage, made institutions vulnerable to fire sales that destroy asset value, in the event of a rate rise. Conflicts of interest in rating agencies, paid by those they rated, created perverse incentives.
Following the legal changes, notional amounts outstanding in derivatives grew from There is a counter-argument that excess savings and high foreign exchange reserves in Asian countries triggered risky innovation to satisfy demand for high rated assets. But compared to the endogenous expansion in financial balance sheets, both the net ownership of US assets by foreigners and reserves were trivial. The former grew by about $1.5 trillion in the period. Asian reserves were less than $3 trillion, while the US current account deficit grew from $200 to $700 billion. These numbers should not disturb a well-regulated, deep and liquid financial system. Internally generated liquidity dwarfed any external source. The reason CBs buy dollar securities is the depth and liquidity of US financial markets that their purchases do not impact. US government securities markets absorbed inflows many magnitudes higher than reserves as funds returned to the US, after the Lehman Brothers crash Moreover, the volatility of cross border capital flows in the period indicates they were investment not savings driven. Finance fuelled consumption booms and asset bubbles were responsible for the flows. CB investments are actually more stable compared to the private flows ).
Bernanke later acknowledged (Bernanke et. al. 2011) So the macroeconomic policy regime did add to risks even if lax financial regulation bears the prime responsibility for the GFC. Are changes in the GFA adequate to address these weaknesses?
III. Financial reforms and institutional change
Underlying the proximate causes above are the fundamental failures finance is subject to. These are asymmetric information, leading to exclusion and arbitrage across assettypes and markets; large systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) that are too big to let fail; and excess volatility or procyclicality . There are also regulatory failures that include delay, and either laxity or over zealousness. Reform, to be successful, must reverse the disincentives legal and institutional reform created, as well as mitigate fundamental failures by improving transparency, competition and reducing incentives for procyclical excessive risk-taking. Moreover, implementation,
to the extent possible, should not rely on discretionary regulatory decisions.
Although the G-20 gives broad directions, the template for worldwide financial reforms is the Basel III, the US Dodd-Frank Act, and similar legislation in the EU.
The sections below assess them on the above criteria.
III. 1 Basel III and country-level legislative changes
New norms for banking regulation, given by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) seek mainly to increase capital buffers, restrict leverage, and cover systemic liquidity and funding risk 4 . Basel III also imposes a leverage ratio 5 (3 per cent) for the first time. 4 The minimum common equity requirement is to rise from 2 percent of risk-weighted assets to 4.5 percent by 1 January 2015. Tier 1 higher quality capital requirement including common equity will increase to 7 percent by Jan 2018, including a capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent to cover future periods of stress. An additional macroprudential countercyclical buffer, within a range of 0% -2.5% of common equity, is to come into effect during periods of systemic risk. Additional collateral would be required for derivative contracts if the institution's credit rating is downgraded. A Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) to meet liquidity risk and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) to cover longer term funding risks and possible haircuts by reducing short-term funding, and stronger regimes for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) have been further delayed, pushed to 2019. The proposed reforms, including dates, are still being negotiated. 5 A leverage ratio of 0.03 implies 3 units of capital must be held against 100 units of the asset, that is the accounting or balance sheet leverage is limited to 1/0.03 or 33.3 to 1. Accounting leverage is the inverse of the leverage ratio and is also known as the leverage multiple. But, at the time of writing, Europe seems to be further softening these proposals so banks do not have to separate out key market-making business. France and Germany are also diluting the capital requirements on their universal banks agreed under the Basel III framework. The outflow calculations determining the LCR and the quality of liquid assets banks have to carry, in order for them to survive a possible future shortterm funding freeze, were moderated in 2013 and the implementation date further postponed. Apart from the government bonds and top-quality corporate bonds required in the initial draft, even equities, BBB-corporate bonds and discounted topquality mortgage-backed securities are now to be counted in liquidity buffers. This is a boost for the securitization industry and has steeply reduced banks' liquidity shortfall. The collateral requirement for OTC derivatives has also been softened 6 .
In other respects the EU wants stricter regulation. In 2013, as part of its ongoing Capital Requirements Directives (CRD4) for banks the European parliament sought to limit bank bonuses to one time the base salary. Shareholder approval would be required for bonuses to increase to two times the base salary. This comes on top of earlier initiatives that reduced bonus pools and linked individual awards to longer term outcomes, by using bail-in bonds or equity subject to clawbacks. There will also be centralized regulation of banks with assets greater than $200b, as part of strengthening the Euro zone. 
III.2 Lacunae in proposed international regulatory changes
Basel III and other proposed post-GFC regulatory changes above may be inadequate because of delays, incompleteness and lack of international harmonization. Proposed reforms are in some ways too strict in allocating all risks to banks, but are too weak in leaving many gaps that enable escape from regulation.
The process of reform outlined above demonstrates the delays. Although enhanced capital requirements under Basel III are only to kick in from 2018, countries are already trying to weaken the standards. The Dodd-Frank Act has been passed but its sheer size and complexity will lead to protracted legal wrangling aimed at expanding the ambit of the many exemptions given. This illustrates the incompleteness. It is inherently difficult to distinguish between trading on own account and that undertaken for clients.
Incompleteness comes in through many other dimensions. It affects institutions and transactions, and also appears over time. Any kind of incompleteness gives rise to arbitrage gaps. The Basel III and Dodd-Frank focus on banks will drive more financial intermediation to the shadow-banking sector. A measure like the Hanson et al. (2011) suggested imposition of a minimum haircut requirement at the level of asset-backed securities for all investors, not just on banks, can constrain short-term leverage for all investors taking a position in credit assets, thus restraining shadowbanks also.
Since individuals do not take into account systemic spillovers from their decisions, risks build up cyclically. This basic market failure acting over time makes countercyclical macro prudential regulations that increase the long-term cost of giving credit during booms and reduce these costs during busts, essential. But these have been left to systemic councils where problems of regulatory discretion and coordination will lead to critical delays.
International harmonization is much more difficult to achieve and this failure also creates arbitrage gaps. The disagreements between US, UK and the EU originate from differing financial structures. The UK wants to preserve the current dominance of the city of London as a financial centre. The US and UK want reforms that do not destroy the market-based Anglo-Saxon model of finance. They are worried about competition from fledging Asian financial centers. Major EU countries have a more bank-based model and want to protect their banks, especially since the GFC and the Euro-debt crisis that followed has left them weak.
Simple regulatory measures that can be applied universally are necessary to prevent one jurisdiction stalling regulatory reform in order not to lose competition to another more liberal jurisdiction. Reforms that are simple yet improve market incentives are preferable also since the GFC demonstrated regulatory failure. Simple robust reforms are less vulnerable to regulatory capture, discretion and delays.
Prudential regulation does align incentives by putting the entity's own capital at risk.
But its primary purpose is providing a buffer to absorb shocks. These tend to be procyclical, hurting recovery-loss-absorbing buffers may have to be built up in bad times. Moreover, this is difficult to do so delays are negotiated, as in the current Basel III. Shin and Shin (2011) argue the focus should be on preventing risky behaviour rather than on the loss-absorbing or shock-insulating role of buffers.
Traders clustering in activities that appear low risk, make them risky. This endogenous creation of risk is one reason why the risk assets-based capital buffers of Basel II were inadequate. But Basel III continues this approach 7 . Risks also change for exogenous reasons-Euro sovereign debt had zero risk weights before the problems in Greece exposed underlying risks. Accounting conventions that affect the measurement of assets also affect leverage. Economic leverage is actually a broader measure. Off balance sheet assets also need to be captured.
Basel III does introduce leverage ratios but they are still generous. Since the risk based approach reduces capital adequacy in relation to actual exposure, considerable leverage is still feasible. A given level of leverage can be achieved either by mandating the asset cover (through the leverage ratio), or restricting leverage itself.
Tighter leverage (through different types of broad pattern regulation such as provisioning norms) can cap leverage at a level below the ceiling derived from the level of assets and the leverage ratio.
A leverage cap may make the delay in implementing full capital adequacy more acceptable. Moreover, the potential rise in leverage is much larger for large banks with large capital so a leverage cap is a more effective instrument for large banks that could otherwise create systemic risk (Goyal 2013) . Thus it would mitigate the risk from SIFIs, which has increased because of greater post-crisis concentration.
Other potential tools that restrict leverage are taxes and margin requirements. They are automatically counter-cyclical since the tax base expands in good times, and they can be designed to fall more on highly leveraged activities, thus providing good forward-looking incentives (IMF, 2010 But given resistance to a tax on transactions independent of profits made, a financial activities' tax (FAT) that falls on profits and therefore is not passed on to consumers of financial services, could be negotiated. But an FTT has the advantage that it applies in the jurisdiction where a transaction is made, and potential profits earned, while a profits tax earns revenues only for the country of residence or country of source depending on tax agreements to avoid double taxation. An FTT shares taxes under dominant tax by residence clauses that favour advanced economies (AEs), from where the majority of portfolio investments originate.
Margin requirements and position limits are also not uniform across countries. There is evidence that short-term futures price bubbles are more pronounced in domains with lax regulation (Goyal and Tripathi, 2013) , and contribute to the deviation of commodity prices from fundamentals. Sectoral provisioning requirements are an example of such regulation that reduces excessive risk-taking. Prompt corrective action (PCA), with minimum regulatory delay, is easier in response to sectoral cycles than aggregate cycles. When Indian real estate prices rose, a countercyclical rise in provisioning for bank housing and commercial real estate loans was more effective than changing risk weights, since provisioning affects the profit and loss account of banks. There was scope for escaping the effect of risk weights since average capital adequacy ratios were above the minimum (Sinha, 2011).
Relatively conservative accounting standards, without full mark-to-market requirements, also reduced pro-cyclical incentives. They did not permit recognition of unrealized gains in equity, but unrealized losses had to be accounted. Banks had to periodically mark-to-market only investments held in trading categories. They had to provide for net losses while ignoring net gains. Securitization guidelines imposed conservative capital adequacy requirements exposures. Profits on sale of assets to a special purpose vehicle could not be recognized immediately on sale but only over the life of pass through certificates issued ).
International fair value accounting norms are being adjusted in these directions, for example by shifting from incurred loss, which is cyclical, to expected loss. BCBS Financial systems in EMs tend to be bank dominated. Banks and their lending have to expand with development, along with other legal, governance, and market reforms.
Therefore, a solely bank-focused reform program hurts them disproportionately, while the neglect of shadow banking and liquidity creation hurts them again through volatility in capital flows. Therefore, better-balanced reform would bring EMs on board, even as it improves global financial stability.
To summarize, changes in financial regulations may be in the right direction, they are too small, too slow, too narrow and too dependent on individual country and regulatory discretion. Dodd-Frank can force more transparency, information sharing, reporting and auditing, in OTC markets, especially since suitable technology is available, only provided exemptions are not given. While teeth have been provided against SIFIs and the shadow banking system, there is no warrantee they will be used.
Non-discretionary direct rules such as prompt corrective action against a troubled financial firm, or leverage caps, or removal of all exemptions on transparent trading of complex financial derivatives can be more effective. Without these, for example, exemptions for FX swaps could be used to structure swap transactions to avoid regulation to expand shadow banking activity and create systemic risks. Large areas of discretion in addressing systemic failures and cross border arbitrage by SIFIs imply a question mark over implementation.
One consequence of volatile cross border flows is high exchange rate volatility and rising foreign exchange reserves. These connections are explored in the next section.
IV. Global Imbalances, Capital Flows, and Currency Wars
In the post GFC period, the concern with global imbalances has morphed into the fear that countries will deliberately seek to depreciate their currencies in order to boost exports and create jobs. The Brazilian finance minister, Guido Mantega, coined the term ‗currency wars' in 2010 as QE in the US and elsewhere generated sharp inflows that appreciated the Brazilian Real. The Brazilian response was to impose market based capital controls to discourage inflows. There was a reversal of capital account convertibility in many EMs.
Easy liquidity also contributed to a sharp recovery of oil prices even though global demand remained low. This hit oil importing EMs. For countries such as India, whose current account deficit (CAD) of the balance of payments widened as a consequence.
Outflows of foreign portfolio investment that occurred in risk-off periods whenever global financial fragility rose, due to events such as the European debt crisis, made it difficult to finance the CAD. Episodes of rupee depreciation increased the import bill, given inelastic demand for commodities such as oil and gold.
The dollar carry trade, due to low US interest rates, is also a problem, especially for More countries, however, are seeking to restrict the capital account through the market, which is regarded as more acceptable. IMF views themselves have softened towards the use of capital controls. The use of the latter is now recommended in the face of volatile capital flows, but only as a last resort, and if other macroeconomic fundamentals are in order (Ostry et. al. 2010 ).
In the light of this history, the current debate on currency wars makes two errors.
First, to assume any kind of intervention implies currency manipulation. Second, that any kind of restriction on capital movement is unwarranted disruption of markets.
These presumptions cannot be correct when there is no legal international agreement on currency regimes, and when markets themselves are subject to persistent deviations from fundamentals.
At the very least, it is essential to distinguish countries with a CAD from those with a CAS. If a country has a persistent CAD its exchange rate cannot be undervalued.
Countries with a very large persistent CAS that creates spillovers for other nations do have a moral obligation to adjust. The discussion on imbalances and exchange rate regimes is dominated by China, which has above 3 trillion dollars of reserves and a large current account surplus so the exchange rate may be undervalued. But it is not true that all countries with rising reserves have a current account surplus. Among the G 20 countries with rising reserves and a deficit are South Africa, Mexico, Israel, India, and Brazil. Therefore the mercantilist, or export encouraging, motive is ruled out for these countries.
Countries are forced to use a variety of measures to protect themselves from excess volatility of capital flows. These responses to inadequacies in the current GFA should not be regarded as currency manipulation.
Reserve accumulation as a self-insurance mechanism, however, is expensive as well as has limited utility. Countries whose reserves were based on inflows did not use the reserves during the months of the GFC when outflows were large, preferring to depreciate exchange rates instead (Aizenman, 2009) . The tendency to add to reserves but not to let them fall, suggests a hoarding motive. Most countries fear market interpretations of a fall in reserves, and the possible downward spiral it may set off.
Rating agencies give too much weight to measurable aspects and tend to downgrade a country whose reserves fall, since the latter are regarded as a signal of strength. So the precautionary use of reserves is limited then only to the signal. In addition, psychological pressures, such as bettering one's own past record, tend to keep raising the threshold for reserves. 
Graph: Rising thresholds in FX reserves
Annual data for the G-20 shows that except for US, UK, Euro Area, Chile and Argentina, reserves have tended to increase steadily since the nineties, the period of large inflows. All EMs had a substantial rise in reserves over -2011 (IMF 2012 Kong were in the 0-300 range and Russia, Saudi Arabia and Japan in the 0-1200 range.
Only countries in an inner financial circle have ready access to US Fed swaps and other reliable international liquidity support. They did not raise their reserve holdings.
Mutual vulnerabilities and interests is a precondition for availability of swap lines.
Moreover, they are giver not user driven, are typically of short duration, and limited by moral hazard considerations.
Capital-account management policies that reduce short-term inflows can be a substitute for costly reserve accumulation. Any type of tax on inflows implicitly subsidizes the costs of reserves held, funding the accumulation of reserves by the activities that create the need to self-insure by these reserves. (Goyal, 2005) .
Improving the nature of international financial integration and confidence in the GFA is the better way to reduce imbalances. Credible global governance is required for this. The changes at present are inadequate.
V. Global governance and reform
The G-20 was very successful in coordinating a global monetary-fiscal stimulus after the GFC. But conflicts between AEs and EMs because of different speeds of recovery, and a loss of focus on financial reform, made it less effective over time.
Even so, regular dialogue among a broader set of participants did serve a useful purpose-in particular in preventing formal restrictions on international trade. (Ostry et. al. 2012) . It says the latter is ‗much thornier'! It will be a major step towards symmetry if the onus for capital flow volatility is put on source countries also instead of the current system where the entire burden of adjustment is borne by recipient countries. But it is not clear that actual adjustment will be symmetric. After the East Asian crisis EMs reformed, but developed countries did not. Nor was the GFA modified. AEs take the position that asset bubbles are not due to QE but to EM demand, again putting all the onus on EMs. While EMs are allowing currency appreciation and stimulating domestic demand to correct global imbalances, deficit reduction in AEs has been indefinitely postponed.
In the June Toronto G-20 meet AEs committed to -at least halve deficits by 2013 and stabilize or reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios by 2016‖. But at the 2012 summit in Mexico City, it was admitted this target would not be achieved. Moreover, it was said to be not advisable to reduce deficits given continued global uncertainties.
Instead AEs only committed to -ensure that the pace of fiscal consolidation is appropriate to support the recovery‖ 9 . The argument that in a balance sheet recession when the private sector is deleveraging, and there is a possibility of a debt deflation trap, the government must spend has some validity. Reducing debt and deficits is easier when growth is higher. But if feasible future growth is overestimated, the stimulus given today can be excessive and recreate conditions that led to the GFC.
In the absence of meaningful reform in the GFA, and given dangers from volatile and poorly regulated capital flows, EMs are forced to continue with costly self-insurance.
Participating in regional initiatives may help ensure a better balance of power and more symmetric adjustment. Then the financial reforms necessary to reduce spillovers of QE policy and strengthen the GFA may be implemented, and EMs gain more freedom to follow context specific macroeconomic policies.
Capacity building is especially important for EMs and global standards must be sensitive to context. Market deepening is in EMs own interest, but more opening has to be calibrated and is conditional on a better GFA, market institutions, and symmetric adjustment.
VI. Conclusion
The paper analyzes the process of change in the GFA, lacunae in the process and potential improvements. Although there has been some post GFC improvement in the GFA, and the institutions underlying it, it is far from adequate or complete. They have more voice now but EMs lost an opportunity to improve global stability, and contributed to a diffusion of the G-20 agenda, by not insisting on a more even sharing of adjustment costs. They accepted strongly held AE positions without pushing for modifications that could moderate the spillovers from AE actions. Pressure from AEs also led to inappropriate macroeconomic policies in some EMs.
At present, financial reform proposals are more complex than necessary, and subject to continuing dilutions and delay, while monetary and exchange rate policies imposed are often simpler than required in the EM context. For example, despite having robust financial regulation without the disincentives that full or no liability involves, India is imposing stringent, expensive Basel norms not suited to its bank-led system with underdeveloped credit. If, instead, global standards adopted these features the GFA would improve.
Monetary-fiscal policy was too loose initially in following the international stimulus despite continuing high food inflation. Then first monetary and later fiscal policy was forced to tighten excessively. Growth fell even as oil shocks and sudden brakes in inflows due to global conditions and to the hands off exchange rate policy, again followed on global advice, contributed to steep exchange rate depreciations and to inflation. This is unfortunate because understanding EM context and helping them to follow appropriate policies will help AEs. Lower growth in EMs harms recovery in AEs.
